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InTroducTIon
In February 2011, activists marched across Nairobi, Kenya to the Chinese embassy waving banners and chanting “haki yetu!” (our right!).1 They demanded that the Chinese gov-
ernment end Chinese companies’ involvement in construction 
of the Gibe 3 dam, Ethiopia’s largest ever public infrastructure 
project.2 The activists had previously petitioned the Chinese 
government, Chinese companies, the Kenyan government, and 
Ethiopian government, but received no response.3 The march 
symbolized people’s frustration in being unable to communicate 
with the Chinese companies involved in the project.4
The Gibe 3 dam will span across the Omo River in Ethio-
pia, which flows into Lake Turkana on the southern border with 
Kenya.5 When completed in 2012, the dam will reduce the Omo 
River’s flow by thirty percent, affecting the 500,000 local people 
who depend on the lake and river for their livelihoods.6 The Lake 
Turkana region is already a landscape in crisis. According to 
several independent studies, the reduced water flow could lead 
to food insecurity, intensify pre-existing tribal conflicts in the 
area, and potentially destabilize the region near the Ethiopian, 
Kenyan, and Sudanese borders.7 The Gibe 3 dam is one of five 
large hydropower projects underway in Ethiopia.8 More dams 
are planned as the Ethiopian government has decided to export 
electricity to neighboring countries (although agreements have 
not yet been reached with these countries).9 When the dam’s res-
ervoir is filled, over 100,000 people will need to relocate to grow 
crops.10 Hundreds of thousands of others may lose their liveli-
hoods from herding, fishing, and trading.11
Many foreign investors declined to finance the project. In 
2008, JPMorgan Chase decided not to underwrite the project, 
and by 2010 the World Bank, African Development Bank, and 
European Investment Bank also withdrew funding consider-
ations.12 In July 2010, however, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (“ICBC,” the world’s largest bank) agreed to 
become the project’s largest lender, granting a loan of $500 mil-
lion to a Chinese company to provide equipment necessary to 
construct the dam.13
The Gibe 3 dam project is one example of how China’s 
overseas investments have gained international media attention 
in recent years. China’s decades-long growth has made it the sec-
ond largest economy in the world, surpassing Japan in mid-2010 
and soon to eclipse the United States.14 As China’s economy 
grows, so does its demand for natural resources and new mar-
kets.15 The Chinese government has shaped its foreign policy to 
keep up with demand for energy and resources by encouraging 
companies to “go global.”
From a macroeconomic perspective, the results have been 
impressive. Overseas investments have tapped natural resources 
ranging from minerals and oil in Africa, to hydropower in South-
east Asia.16 New markets have opened for Chinese goods and 
services.17 Many Chinese companies have found particularly 
lucrative opportunities in impoverished, resource-rich develop-
ing countries.18 In 2010, China became Africa’s largest trading 
partner.19 Yet at the same time, many people have expressed 
concern about the environmental and human rights footprint of 
these investments.20
This article provides a brief overview of efforts underway 
to strengthen environmental and social sustainability in China’s 
overseas investments. In recent years, the Chinese government 
and several companies have recognized the importance of ensur-
ing that investments are responsible, and have begun to adopt 
standards that govern overseas investments. The article first pro-
vides a brief overview of China’s approach to overseas invest-
ments, using examples from Africa. The article then describes 
how Western and multilateral financial institutions have tradi-
tionally played a role in promoting environmentally and socially 
responsible investments, and considers whether Chinese finan-
cial institutions could play a similar role. This article will also 
examine the environmental and social standards that are emerg-
ing for China’s overseas investments.
chIna’s aPProach To oVerseas InVesTmenTs
In 2001, China’s tenth Five-Year Plan21 directed Chinese 
companies to “go global,” as a way to gain access to natural 
resources, stimulate China’s exports, and build China’s markets 
abroad.22 The Chinese government, in turn, provided support 
to companies, including access to finance, tax exemptions, and 
insurance to lower the costs of doing business.23 As a result of 
the “go global” Strategy, China’s foreign direct investment flows 
increased from less than one billion dollars in 2000 to an esti-
mated fifty-five billion dollars in the first half of 2010 alone.24
As early as 1954, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai announced 
the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” that continue to 
set the parameters for China’s approach to international develop-
ment: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
(2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s 
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internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful 
coexistence.25
Based on these principles, the Chinese government has 
branded Chinese overseas investment as a “new type” of stra-
tegic partnership for developing countries that differs from 
Western aid and investment.26 China’s overseas investments are 
closely linked to its development aid—both are important parts 
of the loan packages that the Chinese government often negoti-
ates with host governments. The Chinese government encour-
ages “win-win” development, guarantees non-interference in 
domestic affairs, and promises not to condition the receipt of 
aid on governance and democratic reforms.27 Often, Chinese aid 
comes in the form of infrastructure projects that are built by Chi-
nese companies.
natural reSource extraction in aFrica
Like many Western investments, a significant portion of 
China’s investments in Africa focus on natural resource extrac-
tion. Over fifty percent of all foreign direct investment inside 
Africa goes towards natural resource exploitation.28 Over one 
quarter of U.S. and Chinese imports come from major African 
oil exporting countries—Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria for the 
United States and Angola, Sudan, and Libya for China.29 Since 
2000, the number of oil companies operating in Africa (both 
private and state-owned) has increased from 250 to over 800.30 
Competition to exploit Africa’s natural resources is growing.31
Chinese oil companies remain relatively small players in 
Africa, providing only eight percent of the combined commer-
cial value of international oil companies’ investments in Africa.32 
Due to intense competition, Chinese companies have often 
invested in developing countries with weak governance systems, 
political instability, and high levels of corruption.33 Many com-
panies—both Western and Chinese—have come under criticism 
for their environmental and human rights records in Africa.34 In 
this sense, China’s interest in Africa’s natural resources is not 
unique but often receives media attention because of its high-
risk approach.
challengeS in protecting the environment anD 
human rightS
While Chinese companies are not unique in their interest 
in Africa’s natural resources, their approach often differs from 
Western counterparts. This poses distinct challenges in uphold-
ing environmental and human rights protections.
Chinese aid often takes the form of turn-key projects—
financed and built entirely by Chinese companies, and then 
turned over to the host government with technical assistance. 
These projects focus overwhelmingly (but not always) on con-
crete infrastructure projects such as roads and dams.35 After the 
civil war ended in Angola in 2002, for example, China was one 
of the first countries to provide development assistance.36 With 
Chinese support, Angola initiated over one hundred projects in 
energy, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, 
and public works.37 Many of these projects involved construc-
tion of new infrastructure.
The relationship between China and Angola is complex, but 
several elements are revealing about the nature of China’s over-
seas investments:38
• The Chinese government worked directly with Angola’s 
president. In 2006, the president described the relation-
ship as “mutually advantageous,” “pragmatic,” and with 
“no political preconditions.”39 Cooperation is characterized 
by frequent bilateral visits of important state officials, and 
signing of various agreements. In these high-level negotia-
tions, there was little accountability to the public or efforts 
to respond to public concerns.40
• Bilateral trade increased rapidly in a few years time. Crude 
oil was the main Angola export to China, and imports from 
China also increased—including steel, cement, autos, and 
batteries.41 China was a major source of foreign direct 
investment, especially through the entry of Chinese con-
struction firms.42
• Although China received the most media attention, it was not 
the only actor. Angola also had investment agreements with 
India, Brazil, South Africa, and others that have increased in 
volume.43 Over time, other donors have expressed a willing-
ness to extend credit lines to Angola.44
• China’s loans to Angola were backed by oil revenue. In 2004, 
China Export Import Bank pledged a two billion dollar oil-
backed loan to Angola to fund reconstruction of infrastruc-
ture.45 For each project, the Chinese government proposed a 
few Chinese companies.46 Repayment began as soon as the 
project was completed.47 Revenue from oil was deposited in 
an escrow account, from which the amount for servicing the 
debt was deducted.48 The Government of Angola was then 
free to use the remainder at its own discretion.49 Loans were 
provided at a deeply concessional rate (LIBOR +1.5%).50
• Chinese laborers remained separate from the local popu-
lation. Chinese laborers typically stayed in Angola for one 
or two year contracts, often living in closed compounds 
near the construction site.51 There was little contact with 
Angolans.52 At the same time, a growing number of Chi-
nese entrepreneurs entered Angola.53 Communication chal-
lenges existed due to cultural differences and language 
barriers, and most businesses remained separate from local 
communities.54
• Corporate social responsibility was not part of the business 
plan. Chinese companies did not interact with local com-
munities or civil society organizations, and did not discuss 
environmental and human rights concerns openly.55 In gen-
eral, Chinese companies did not keep local communities 
informed of operations.56
usIng FInance To hoLd comPanIes  
accounTabLe For oVerseas ImPacTs
Civil society activists have long struggled to find ways to 
hold companies accountable for the environmental and human 
rights impacts of their overseas operations. Traditionally, the laws 
of the United States and other major investor countries do not 
apply overseas.57 One important approach, developed over the 
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past two decades by activists, has been to follow the money—to 
ensure that companies and governments only receive financing 
for projects that are environmentally and socially responsible.58
Many, but not all companies rely on financing to pursue 
large-scale overseas investments. When companies seek financ-
ing from investors, they often must prove that the investment 
is likely to generate a return. This includes identifying risks to 
the project’s success and demonstrating that these risks can be 
mitigated.59
Increasingly, companies acknowledge that environmental 
and human rights risks can harm the success of a development 
project (see Box 1).60 Harm to communities can lead to protests 
that block or delay construction, and can motivate governments 
to alter licenses, permits, and oversight of projects. Local and 
international civil society campaigns can also damage the repu-
tations of companies and financial institutions involved, affect-
ing share prices and the implementation of related projects.61
Box 1: Environmental and Social Risks62
When investing in developing countries, companies increas-
ingly consider the ways that harm to the environment and 
local communities can affect a project. The following are 
examples of risks that can arise out of environmental and 
human rights harms.
Financing risk – Financial institutions and investors may 
delay their financing, require more conditions, or decide not 
to participate.
Construction risk – The proponent may not be able to com-
plete the project on time or on budget.
Operational risk – The proponent may not be able to access 
necessary inputs, produce sufficient output, or sell at a suf-
ficient price, which can disrupt operations.
Reputational risk – The project may harm the proponent’s or 
financial institutions’ brand identity, which can translate into 
loss of market value.
Corporate risk – Delays or interruptions to a project may 
reduce the proponent’s profitability and asset values, decreas-
ing the proponent’s stock value, lowering its credit rating, and 
raising the cost of borrowing.
Host government risk – The host government may with-
draw permits and licenses, commence enforcement actions, 
impose civil or criminal penalties on the proponent, or tighten 
requirements.
Host country political risk – Political forces in the host 
country may threaten the project.
As a result, managing environmental and human rights risks 
is not just goodwill, but good business. Many studies show how 
safeguarding against these risks can help to manage the complex 
impacts of development projects.63 For example, engaging local 
communities in the design of a project can help build community 
support for the project and avoid conflict later in the project cycle.64
environmental anD Social StanDarDS oF Financial 
inStitutionS
In response to public criticism of its involvement in contro-
versial projects in the 1980s and 1990s—such as the Narmada 
Dam in India, which displaced over 300,000 people—the World 
Bank developed “safeguard” policies to help identify, avoid, and 
minimize harm to people and the environment.65 These policies 
require borrowing governments to follow risk mitigation proce-
dures in order to receive Bank financing.66 Examples of these 
procedures include conducting an environmental and social 
impact assessment, consulting with local communities, and 
restoring the livelihoods of displaced people.67
Since that time, other financial institutions have adopted 
similar policies.68 The International Finance Corporation 
(“IFC”)—the private sector financing arm of the World Bank 
Group—developed a detailed set of environmental and social 
standards in 2006.69 Over sixty private financial institutions have 
adopted the IFC’s standards through the Equator Principles.70 
These policies are constantly evolving. In 2011, for example, the 
IFC will adopt an updated version of its standards.71
Although these standards are far from perfect and have not 
always successfully prevented harmful investments from going 
forward,72 they have become an important pillar of environmen-
tal and human rights protections in overseas investments.
a roLe For chInese banks In  
susTaInabLe deVeLoPmenT?
Is there a role for Chinese banks to promote environmen-
tally and socially responsible overseas investments? In the past 
few years, both the Chinese government and several Chinese 
financial institutions have recognized the importance of envi-
ronmental and social standards.73 Efforts are now underway to 
develop these standards in the Chinese context.74
China’s financial sector has the potential to play an influen-
tial role in strengthening the environmental and social perfor-
mance of China’s overseas investments. Because many Chinese 
companies do not raise funds in the capital markets, the major-
ity of total capital available to Chinese industry comes from 
financial institutions.75 Over the past five years, in response to 
concern about the massive pollution that accompanies China’s 
rapid growth, the Chinese government has begun to apply “green 
credit” policies to domestic lending.76 Chinese officials have 
also worked closely with international financial institutions, par-
ticularly the IFC, to build capacity of Chinese financial institu-
tions to manage environmental and social risks.77 While still in 
their early years, China’s “green credit” policy has demonstrated 
measurable success.78
government inFluence over overSeaS inveStmentS
While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese com-
panies to “go global,” these companies are not merely arms of the 
central government; many companies are encouraged to act auton-
omously.79 For example, many Chinese national oil companies, 
SuStainable Development law & policy25
are partially owned and controlled by the government,80 but have 
gained influence due to surging profits, listing on foreign stock 
exchanges, and relationships with international investors.81 Sig-
nificant profits from years of high oil prices have also enabled 
Chinese oil companies to finance their own investments, rather 
than relying solely on Chinese financial institutions.
Nevertheless, the government continues to provide financial 
support to these companies to help them compete against established 
international oil companies.82 In particular, Chinese banks play a 
prominent role in large acquisitions and investments and in negotia-
tions with host governments.83 As many Chinese companies interact 
at least to a certain extent with Chinese banks, their influence over 
environmental and social standards could continue to grow.
key bankS in china’S overSeaS inveStmentS
Although China’s largest private and state-owned banks 
often invest overseas, China’s state-owned “policy banks” are 
the leading financial actors behind the “go global” strategy.84 
The two primary banks that support overseas investments are 
the Export Import Bank of China (“China ExIm”) and the China 
Development Bank (“CDB”).85
Most major economies have “export credit agencies” 
that help to finance companies exporting goods and services 
abroad.86 China ExIm is one of the largest export credit agencies 
in the world.87 In 2009, ExIm and CBD combined approved over 
one hundred and ten billion dollars in lending.88 Founded as a 
policy bank, and now a semi-private bank, China Development 
Bank has also been one of the key funders of large infrastructure 
and industrial projects overseas.89
As Deborah Brautigam of American University describes:
The importance of policy banks like the ExIm Bank and 
China Development Bank in China’s development model 
and its international economic relations cannot be empha-
sized too strongly. China . . . is in many ways a typical East 
Asian developmental state. It acts to accelerate development 
through deliberate use of state policies. The central charac-
teristic of a developmental state is its control over finance. 
This control need not be exclusive – but it must be important 
at the margin in order to influence the behavior of firms in 
directions determined by political leaders. In this regard, Bei-
jing is following directly in the footsteps of the earlier Asian 
successes, Japan, Korean, and Taiwan, who all used develop-
ment finance to “pick winners” in the globalization race.90
In the next five years, we can expect these financial institu-
tions to play an increasingly important role in encouraging Chi-
nese companies towards environmentally and socially responsible 
investments. In March 2011, the National Peoples’ Congress met 
in Beijing to approve the next Five-Year Plan.91 At the core of this 
plan are environmental protection and social equity.92
emergIng sTandards In chIna’s  
oVerseas InVesTmenTs
Standards are already emerging that could influence China’s 
overseas investments. These include domestic policies, volun-
tary corporate standards, and policies designed specifically for 
overseas investments.
DomeStic policieS
For several years, Chinese financial institutions have pur-
sued “green credit” policies in their domestic lending.93 In 2003, 
China adopted a stronger environmental impact assessment law 
that ensures greater public participation in project decision-
making.94 In 2007, the State Environmental Protection Agency 
(now the Ministry of Environment), Peoples’ Bank of China, and 
Central Banking Regulatory Commission issued a green credit 
policy that requires all commercial banks to conduct environ-
mental screening of loans, and to restrict lending to companies 
with high energy consumption and pollution.95 The policy also 
established a credit blacklist that prohibits banks from lending 
to companies that fail to meet environmental standards. The 
Chinese government followed the Green Credit Policy with a 
Green Trade Policy (2007), Green Securities Policy (2008), and 
a Green Insurance Policy (2008).96 In 2008, the government took 
measures to increase public access to environmental information 
from the government and companies.97 These experiences may 
help to inform future standards for China’s overseas investments.
voluntary corporate StanDarDS
In 2008, President Hu Jintao announced that companies 
should establish the concept of global responsibility, 
include social responsibility in their business strategy 
on their own, abide by the laws in the country where 
the enterprises operate and international common busi-
ness practices, improve their management models, and 
pursue unity of economic returns and social results.98
Encouraged by the government, some Chinese banks and 
companies are taking an interest in corporate social responsibil-
ity.99 This becomes particularly relevant as Chinese banks and 
companies increasingly interact on a global scale, enter foreign 
stock exchanges, and market their products abroad.
In 2007, China Construction Bank was the first state-
owned Chinese bank to publish a corporate social responsibil-
ity report.100 In the following year, China Development Bank, 
ICBC, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of China also 
released their first reports.101 In 2008, Industrial Bank became 
the first private Chinese bank to adopt the Equator Principles,102 
a global standard for environmentally and socially responsible 
project finance. Although many banks’ voluntary corporate stan-
dards focus on their domestic lending activities, this may soon 
expand to overseas lending.
overSeaS lenDing
Traditionally, Chinese banks and companies have addressed 
environmental and social risks only by complying with host coun-
tries’ laws and regulations. As companies expand their operations 
in countries with weak governance and regulatory capacity, and as 
other multilateral institutions improve their own standards, Chi-
nese companies appear to be moving in a similar direction.
Slowly but steadily, environmental and social standards 
are emerging for financial institutions’ overseas lending (see 
Emerging Standards for Chinese overseas investment Box 2). All 
financial institutions now apply the government’s Green Credit 
Policy to domestic lending. In 2004, China Export Import Bank 
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developed a short set of environmental guidelines for its over-
seas lending, and publicly disclosed revised, more robust guide-
lines in 2008.103 These guidelines require clients to conduct an 
environmental and social impact assessment.104 China ExIm 
monitors the client’s implementation of the assessment.105
In 2009, the Ministry of Environmental Protection’s think 
tank, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, along 
with the non-governmental Global Environmental Institute and 
the University of International Business and Economics, com-
pleted draft environmental guidelines for Chinese companies 
involved in aid and overseas investment.106 Several Chinese 
ministries and regulatory bodies are negotiating the guidelines 
and may approve them in the coming months.107 The guidelines 
would require companies operating overseas to conduct envi-
ronmental impact assessments, develop mitigation measures, 
compensate people for environmental damage, and adhere to 
international treaties signed by China and host countries.108 Chi-
nese companies would be required to follow Chinese environ-
mental standards if they were higher than host countries.109
Box 2: Emerging Standards for Chinese Overseas Investment
Date Description of standards
2004 China Exim Environment Policy110
Three-paragraph policy developed in 2004 but pub-
licly released only in April 2007.
2006 State Council’s Nine Principles on Overseas 
Investment111
Developed to “encourage and standardize” compa-
nies’ overseas investment. Requires Chinese com-
panies to comply with local laws, design contract 
bidding to be transparent, protect labor rights of local 
employees, protect the environment, and implement 
corporate responsibilities.
2007 China Export Import Bank’s Environmental 
Guidelines112
Publicly released in 2008. Governs investments 
overseas. Requires companies to conduct an environ-
mental impact assessment and to compensate com-
munities for environmental damage.
2007 Guide on Sustainable Overseas Silviculture by 
Chinese Enterprises113
Governs the overseas practices of Chinese logging 
companies. Requires preservation of high value for-
ests and endangered species, monitoring systems, 
and consultations with local communities.
2008 SASAC statement on overseas state-owned companies114
The Director of State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (which governs state-
owned companies) stated that Chinese companies 
going abroad must comply with international rules 
and local laws.
2008 State Council regulations on international 
contracts115
A State Council regulation allows the government to 
fine companies up to RMB one million for undertak-
ing contracts without official approval. This regula-
tion improves government supervision, protects the 
rights of Chinese workers, and enhances compliance 
with host country laws.
2008 National Audit Office’s new department on over-
seas assets116
The office announced a new department focusing on 
state-owned or central-capital controlled companies 
and overseas national assets. The department will 
seek to uncover any potential misuse of funds, with 
special attention to overseas state owned assets.
2009 Draft environmental guidelines for overseas 
investment117
The Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, 
in cooperation with the Global Environmental Insti-
tute and the University of International Business and 
Economics, completed draft guidelines. The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission are negotiating the final 
guidelines.
concLusIon
As Chinese banks and companies continue to expand their 
overseas footprint, they will undertake more projects in envi-
ronmentally and socially sensitive areas. The Chinese govern-
ment’s current efforts to develop standards are an important first 
step, but other changes will need to follow. As Western financial 
institutions have experienced, policies on paper are meaningless 
unless they change the behavior of companies abroad.
Numerous challenges remain. The implementation of any 
guidelines will need buy-in and coordination across the numer-
ous Chinese agencies involved in overseas investment. Financial 
institutions will also begin to explore ways to enforce and hold 
companies accountable for their environmental and social per-
formance. Chinese companies have little experience in engaging 
directly with local communities and civil society organizations, 
even though direct engagement is the pillar of environmental 
and human rights risk management.
Chinese banks and companies can learn from foreign com-
panies by engaging in dialogue and trading experiences, but this 
will not be enough. Ultimately, a uniquely Chinese approach 
will need to develop to environmental and social risk man-
agement that is appropriate for Chinese culture, but also fully 
respects the environment and human rights of local communi-
ties. In this way, the Chinese development model can truly help 
to bring “mutual benefit” and “win-win” development to other 
developing countries.
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